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Analysis of data from 1007 UK general aviation (GA) accidents demonstrates 
the predominant cause of accidents is loss of control, exacerbated by a 
lack of recent flying experience. These are long-standing problems which 
can be targeted effectively with simulation training. Discussion on 
training strategies in commercial aviation reinforces the logic of 
introducing simulation training for the GA pilot. Conclusions drawn affirm 
the notion that GA safety would benefit from implementation of regulated 
simulation training. 
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INTRODUCTION 
From January 2005 to December 2011 there were 1007 accidents 
pertaining to UK fixed wing general aviation (GA) analysis of which 
revealed 49.7% resulted from loss of control (LOC), 69.2% of these 
occurring during the landing phase. Of 55 fatal accidents, 60% occurred 
during the cruise and 45.5% were a consequence of LOC.  
Current requirements for the issue of a Private Pilot’s License (PPL) 
state a ‘‘maximum of 5 hours may have been completed in a Basic Instrument 
Training Device, Flight and Navigation Procedures Trainer or a flight 
simulator’’ (Civil Aviation Authority; CAA, 2012, Section C, p2). This is 
intended as an instrument appreciation course and does not qualify PPL 
pilots to fly solely by reference to instruments; it is intended as a 
contingency measure should pilots find themselves in poor visibility. In 
commercial aviation, airline pilots are trained extensively in simulators 
for instrument procedures, emergencies and type ratings, flying their 
assigned aircraft type in a simulator before transition to the actual 
aircraft. Every six months they must return to the simulator to practise 
such scenarios and have their general competence assessed. Failure to reach 
required standards may result in the revocation or suspension of their 
license. This intensive use of simulators has a positive impact on 
commercial aviation safety and subsequently is accepted by the operators, 
flight crews, unions and regulators (Allerton, 2002). However, despite the 
effectiveness of simulation training being well documented and accepted in 
airline operations, simulators do not command similar respect and use in 
general aviation (Roscoe, 1982). The operational differences between 
commercial aviation and GA denote that different levels of simulator 
complexity are required for each, the three main types being defined 
according to the CAA (2012) in Table 1. 
Table 1 
CAA definition of each of the three main levels of simulator used for 
flight training 
Simulator 
Description 
Definition According to CAA, CAP 804, Section 1, Part B 
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Basic Instrument 
Training Device 
(BITD) 
Ground-based training device which represents the student pilot’s station 
of a class of aeroplane….providing a training platform for at least the 
procedural aspects of instrument flight 
  
Flight Training 
Device (FTD) 
Full size replica of a specific aircraft type’s instruments, equipment, 
panels and controls in an open flight deck area or an enclosed aircraft 
flight deck….to represent the aircraft in ground and flight conditions….It 
does not require a force cueing motion or visual system 
  
Full Flight 
Simulator (FFS) 
Full size replica of a specific type or make, model and series aircraft 
flight deck….to represent the aircraft in ground and flight operations, a 
visual system providing an out-of-the-flight-deck view and a force cueing 
motion system 
 
Whilst the learning and training paradigms between flying at PPL level 
and those specific to commercial flying are acknowledged as being 
different, each has the common goal of producing competent, safe pilots; if 
one can be enhanced from the proven example of another, then for the sake 
of safety this must be encouraged by the industry. 
METHOD; UK PILOT POPULATION 
Data was retrieved from the UK CAA concerning the number of registered 
license holders within the pilot population and which level of licence they 
hold. This was to determine the proportion of GA and commercial pilots for 
comparison to accident data. For further comparison to the sample data and 
to assess the thoughts and opinions of GA pilots in the UK, a survey was 
compiled and issued online. It was advertised via e-mail to 120 flying 
clubs and schools throughout the UK requesting they encourage their members 
to participate producing an estimated 12000 potential respondents (based on 
an assumed average of 100 members per club, derived from the known number 
of members at several clubs). Despite incentives and follow-up requests, 
only 403 pilots took part, representing a response rate of 3.4%. 
Considering no other such information exists concerning GA pilot opinions 
on simulation, the response was considered adequate enough to provide a 
representative cross section of views. 
Accident reports were obtained from the publications section of the 
Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) website and reviewed in detail. 
Particulars of the pilots were recorded including flying experience, age 
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and license held. Flying experience is divided into three main areas; 
currency (how much flying a pilot has done in the previous 90 and 28 days), 
type experience (how much flying time a pilot has on a particular make and 
model of aircraft) and total experience (all their flying time to date). 
Each accident was entered into one of four categories for qualitative 
analysis; LOC, airmanship, technical or meteorological. Accidents were also 
categorised by phase of flight to establish where the frequency of 
accidents was greatest. 
 Given their prevalence in the data, LOC accidents were analysed with 
comparison to the non LOC categories using t-test statistical calculation. 
An appraisal of accidents concerning flight from visual flight rules (VFR) 
into instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) was also warranted, being 
cited as a major accident causal factor. The results were then evaluated 
with regard to current literature on use of simulation in GA and commercial 
training as well as previous studies on LOC and VFR into IMC accidents.  
RESULTS 
Data from the CAA from 1994 to 2008 (CAA, 2001; 2005; 2006; 2009) 
revealed that within the UK aviation population, the majority of pilots are 
PPL holders. These include those with a National PPL (a restricted version 
of the PPL) and collectively shall be referred to as (N)PPL from herein. 
The data indicates that on average they represent 64.8% of all licensed 
pilots in the UK, the GA survey concurring with these figures, 72.2% being 
(N)PPL holders. These pilots were involved in 70.9% of accidents, 
Commercial Pilot’s License (CPL) and Airline Transport Pilot’s License 
(ATPL) holders respectively accounting for just 11.2% and 9% of all 
accidents.   
During takeoff, cruise and landing, the three main phases of flight, 
mean levels of currency were less for LOC accident pilots than for non-LOC 
accidents, with the exception of the last 90 days in the cruise, (Table 2).  
Table 2 
 
Mean currency (hours) of accident pilots, LOC versus non LOC 
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 Last 90 Days Last 28 Days 
 LOC SD 
Non 
LOC 
SD LOC SD 
Non 
LOC 
SD 
Takeoff 23.5 40.906 36.7 42.922 9.4 14.513 14.8 17.471 
Cruise 34.2 59.891 33.6 48.086 11.0 18.643 12.2 16.955 
Landing 22.6 37.488 34.9 48.150 8.1 12.013 12.9 17.172 
 
None of the differences between LOC and non LOC accident pilot 
currency were significant, with the exception of landing where LOC pilots 
had significantly less currency than non LOC pilots for both the last 90 
and 28 days; Takeoff, last 90 days: t [129] = 1.798,  p < .05, last 28 
days: t [131] = 1.943, p < .05; Cruise, last 90 days: t [134] = 0.042, p < 
.05, last 28 days: t [134] = 0.251, p < .05; Landing, last 90 days: t [529] 
= 3.262, p <.05, last 28 days: t [525] = 3.773, p < .05. Mean total and 
type experience levels of sample LOC pilots were significantly less than 
pilots in other accident types (Table 3). 
Table 3 
 LOC versus non LOC mean pilot experience (hours); total and type 
 LOC SD Non LOC SD 
T-Test Result 
(p < 0.05) 
Total experience 1535.9 3786.215 2584.9 4431.403 4.024 (df, 999) 
Type experience 168.2 363.571 360.1 827.530 4.727 (df, 989) 
 
DISCUSSION; 
LOSS OF CONTROL, A CONTINUING PROBLEM 
The findings in Table 2 conform to the conclusions of the CAA GA Fatal 
Accident Review 1985 - 1994 (CAA, 1997) which determined LOC accidents in 
VFR ‘‘appear to be the result of basic inexperience’’ and that without 
experience they were not adequately prepared for unexpected events. 
Furthermore they concluded that three quarters of pilots losing control in 
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IMC had no rating to permit such flight and suggested that in some cases, a 
technical failure in this situation may have pushed the pilots beyond the 
limits of their capabilities. Combined, LOC in both VFR and IMC was 
apportioned to 28% of fatal accidents in the CAA review, but was found to 
be more predominant in a later regulatory review (CAA, 2006) 48.5% of fatal 
accidents from 1995 to 2004 being cited as due to LOC. Additionally, flight 
handling skills were found to be the most common causal and/or contributory 
factor for LOC in VFR, associated with poor initial training or inadequate 
refresher training, (CAA, 1997). 
 Of all (N)PPL accidents in the sample, 50.4% were attributable to 
LOC, whilst 35.4% of CPL and 35.2% of ATPL accidents occurred following 
LOC.  With such a high proportion of (N)PPL accidents involving LOC and 
mean values for  currency being comparatively low, it is evident that LOC 
is an issue for pilots with a basic license and a low level of recent 
flying experience.  
Although only accounting for 2.5% of the sample accidents, engine 
failure after takeoff (EFATO) is a commonly practised manoeuvre in 
training, as is recovery from stalling (a variant of LOC), but the AAIB 
express concern in one report that ‘‘although many pilots consider their 
actions should the engine fail during takeoff, it seems that fewer pilots 
consider their actions in the case of loss of control’’ (AAIB, 2009, p47). 
Whilst EFATOs and other simulated engine failure scenarios can be 
initiated by an Instructor without prior warning and in rela1tive safety, 
practising stall recovery can be a protracted process, involving a number 
of safety procedures the pilot is required to follow; it must be performed 
at or above 3000 feet to allow adequate recovery time, must not be 
completed over a populated area or near cloud and must be preceded by a 
thorough lookout for other aircraft. Even with the most careful 
preparation, successful completion of the manoeuvre cannot be guaranteed 
and at least one fatal accident in the sample was attributed to LOC 
following stall recovery training. 
Additionally, although not technically LOC in themselves, practise 
stalls are designed to provide pilots with the skills to recover from a 
stall and prevent LOC occurring in the first place. This method is flawed 
in that it centres on recovering from a prepared situation where the pilot 
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forces the aircraft into a stall before recovering on the direction of the 
Instructor. This is wholly unrealistic, stall conditions often evolving 
quickly and without the pilot’s knowledge (they may be distracted for 
example). Once the aircraft stalls, the pilot must not only recognise the 
stall condition (buffet is an indicator of an impending stall but can 
easily be masked by light turbulence), but also take immediate corrective 
action to prevent a full stall and/or spin developing, recovery from which 
is more difficult to execute than the stall conditions practised in 
training. Furthermore, post training, an (N)PPL pilot may fly for years 
before encountering such a scenario, by which time the skills of stall 
recovery may have been long assigned to memory and difficult to recall, 
particularly at such a stressful time. The effects of stress on memory 
include restricting an individual’s ability to encode and retrieve 
information (Kuhlmann et al., 2005) and adversely affecting aspects of the 
working memory (Lee, 1999), causing more false alarms and mistakes than in 
normal situations (Duncko et al., 2009). 
Further to stalling, flaring an aircraft is considered by some to be a 
difficult manoeuvre requiring attention to detail and a healthy respect for 
the limitations of the aircraft (Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association; 
AOPA, 2008). The addition of gusty or crosswind conditions increase the 
level of difficulty; the GA survey revealed 28.6% of respondents declared 
the flare to be  ‘5’ or greater on a Likert scale of 1 - 10, 1 being not 
difficult at all and 10 extremely difficult. This figure increased to 48.9% 
when asked to rate the same manoeuvre in wind.  There are difficulties in 
training for crosswind landings due to an inability to schedule the right 
amount of wind for when it’s needed resulting in many pilots having little 
idea of how to handle such a situation (Landsberg, 2002). Levelling off and 
rounding out an aircraft in preparation for the flare also require 
experience and repeated practise (Benbassat et al., 2005) experience being 
what many GA pilots lack (Benbassat & Abramson, 2002). A poorly executed 
flare can result in a bounce and subsequent LOC, or ballooning which if not 
properly managed may also end in LOC. 
Stall recoveries, landing, LOC scenarios and myriad other manoeuvres 
and procedures can be trained, practised and analysed in relatively basic 
visual flight simulators, before proceeding to the aircraft. Additionally 
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more relevant and transferable pre-flight briefings can be conducted in a 
simulator rendering the subsequent lesson much more productive and 
worthwhile. 
 
LOC IN THE UNITED STATES REFLECTS THE UK 
Data from AOPA’s annual Nall report (AOPA, 1997 - 2011) of accident 
trends and factors from the previous 15 years reveal LOC in GA accidents is 
certainly not restricted to the UK, implying it is a worldwide problem. 
Classed as ‘manoeuvring’ the statistics show it is an increasing problem in 
GA in the USA (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Fatal accidents involving LOC from manoeuvring according to 
AOPA's Nall reports (1997 – 2011) 
 
This information demonstrates that whilst this paper focuses on UK GA 
and the potential benefits of simulation in training, the premise can 
easily be transferred to GA industries and cultures outside the confines of 
the UK. 
EXPERIENCE AND CURRENCY ALSO INFLUENTIAL IN LOC 
 A pilot’s total flying experience is an assemblage of all the 
knowledge and flight time they have accumulated in their flying career and 
may include a variety of aircraft types, including large airliners. This 
knowledge and experience can broadly be applied to all aircraft and all 
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situations although some adaptations will have to be made according to the 
aircraft being flown, the airfield and associated procedures.  
Hours flown on a particular aircraft type are perhaps more valuable, 
familiarity with an aircraft’s handling and cockpit layout being beneficial 
to a pilot in a situation such as a LOC event. Thus greater experience, 
both overall and type specific, results in greater skill, knowledge and 
awareness resulting in a reduced accident risk for the pilot, the sample 
analysis results having proven this to be the case. 
Currency is considered a good indicator of a pilot’s level of skill 
and competence and is necessary to build and maintain decision making 
expertise, Jensen (1997). GA pilots must fly a minimum of 12 hours within 
the previous 12 months preceding expiry of their licence, including 6 hours 
as pilot in command, 12 take-offs and landings and 1 hour with an 
Instructor (CAA, 2010, section F1.5), however O’Hare and Chalmers (1999) 
expressed concern that flying less than 30 minutes per week is insufficient 
to maintain the standards of proficiency needed in a complex and demanding 
activity such as flying. This is supported by the sample data in Table 1 
demonstrating that takeoff, cruise and particularly landing accident pilots 
were deficient in currency. 
CURRENCY DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN 
The sample data contains some evidence to suggest that recent flying 
determines the likelihood of pilots being involved in a LOC or weather 
related accident.  Although not statistically important, maintaining 
currency in the UK is nonetheless a continuing and increasingly difficult 
struggle and remains an area of concern which needs addressing.  
Increasing fuel prices, landing fees, aircraft hire and regulatory 
fees such as medical renewals mean many GA pilots cannot afford to maintain 
a good level of currency resulting in either the need to renew or retire. 
The authors’ survey found that for 43% of pilots the cost of flying affects 
how often they fly all or a lot of the time. Many comments reflected how 
the cost of flying impacts skill levels and overall GA safety: 
 ‘‘Cheap simulated flying would help keep people more current and 
enable them to practise emergency actions.’’ 
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 ‘‘The prohibitively high cost of flying is causing pilots to maintain 
much lower currency levels than in the past which in some cases leads 
to error chains and accidents.’’ 
 ‘‘High costs mean that many GA pilots do not get enough practise.’’ 
 ‘‘As fuel gets more expensive and hours drop as a result there are 
‘out of practise’ safety issues. I would be a better pilot if I flew 
more but can’t afford to.’’ 
The use of simulators was also highly advocated for training and 
practise, 62% and 58.2% of respondents considering there to be room for 
improved simulation in GA for those two tasks respectively. Particular 
interest was allocated to the areas of procedures, emergencies and 
instrument training in a simulator.  
Another barrier to maintaining currency in UK GA that could be 
overcome through improved simulation is the weather, the survey revealing 
it affects 54.8% of pilots in the amount they fly. The use of simulators as 
a substitution when conditions are not conducive to real flying was 
supported by some: 
 (Simulators) ‘‘Would be very valuable on bad weather days.’’ 
 (Simulators would be useful) ‘‘For training & practise when weather 
conditions are not suitable an absolute bonus’’ 
 ‘‘I would use this (simulation), especially when grounded by bad 
weather at the airfield.’’ 
 (Simulators would be) ‘‘Useful for a PPL to keep current in poor 
weather conditions.’’ 
Cost and weather issues combine to produce a situation where pilots 
are not flying as often as they should to keep in good flying practise, not 
because they don’t want to, but because they are unable to. Additional to 
LOC training, simulation in UK GA would allow pilots to maintain a 
satisfactory level of currency at a lower cost, regardless of the weather.  
DECISION MAKING 
Every action pilots take in their flying duties is preceded by some 
form of decision making process, whether active or subliminal. Thus it is 
not hard to conceive that many accidents, of whatever type, involve a 
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flawed decision making process. Naturally accidents can still occur when 
all the right decisions are made, implementation of a decision requiring 
information input; an engine failure can be managed effectively to the 
point of touchdown in a field, but the pilot will not necessarily know the 
condition of the ground, thus cannot make an informed decision on whether 
or not to use the field for the emergency landing. Subsequently, having 
made all the right decisions to reach the field, the pilot may be 
undermined at the last moment when the ground turns out to be soft and the 
aircraft inverts on contact. 
Making a decision effectively comprises three elements as defined by 
Wickens and Flach (1988); The first is evaluation of the information 
available, and the second involves the pilot carefully considering that 
evaluation. Some cues, such as a weather forecast may be unreliable, making 
it probabilistic resulting in the theoretically correct decision 
potentially producing an unfortunate outcome. The third element is a 
cost/benefit assessment; the cost of turning around versus the benefits of 
continuing and vice versa. 
Further to Wickens and Flach (1988), Jensen (1997) cited experience as 
one of five components of aviation decision making pertinent to both GA and 
commercial pilots, training being an integral function thereof.  It was 
stated that whilst initial training sets the standard for the pilot’s 
future flying and can influence habits and associated flight performance, a 
solid knowledge base should also be developed early and periodically 
refreshed to maintain proficiency.  
Although decision making is taught to commercial pilot students, it is 
still restricted to just a few pages in a series of 15 volumes of ATPL 
material published by one Approved Training Organisation (ATO); Oxford 
Aviation Academy, England. Indeed Jensen (1997) expressed concern that most 
students do not receive any structured decision making training at any time 
in their flying career and it is merely assumed that it is something they 
will learn as their experience increases. Given the influence of decision 
making on accident cause and/or outcome there lays great prudence in giving 
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all student pilots more rigorous instruction, both practical and 
theoretical, than is currently offered on the subject.  
To that extent, simulation can offer good practical training without 
inciting risk. Given that a scenario requiring decision making beyond the 
normal scope of flying can be extremely stressful (encountering bad weather 
en route for example) the use of procedural decision aids and check lists 
cued by acronyms needs to be avoided as much as possible, stress tending to 
decrease working memory capacity and cause narrowing of attention (Stokes 
and Kite, 1999). Instead, simulation may be better used to formulate a 
mental directory of scenarios from which the pilot can draw upon in 
stressful situations (Stokes and Kite, 1999). The pilot’s limited spare 
cognitive capacity will then not detract from the most important task of 
flying the aircraft as it might otherwise be. These scenarios can be 
practised over and again at any time during a pilot’s flying career and may 
also provide a template from which they might construct good decisions in 
alternative situations. As alluded to for practical flying skills, use of 
simulation in this manner is likely to be more effective than simple 
discussion in the classroom.  
In accidents where LOC was cited as a factor, timely decision making 
without impeding the pilot’s cognitive capacity to fly the aircraft may 
have produced a more favourable outcome and possibly, the accident may 
never have occurred. Despite this sobering consideration, there is no 
specific requirement for decision making to be taught in any pilot training 
syllabus. Furthermore and particularly in GA, there remains the financial 
hurdle whereby simulation is not economically viable due to regulation and 
thus any implementation of decision making instruction would be made 
without consideration to the potential effectiveness and use of simulators. 
 
REGULATION AFFECTS FINANCE 
The regulations governing the use of simulators are presented in 
‘Joint Aviation Requirements (JAR) Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD) 
A: Aeroplane Flight Simulation Training Devices’ (JAR, 2008). There are 14 
separate regulations concerning the operation of the five recognised 
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simulation devices and 23 pages relating to the minimum standards for 
compliance for each level of simulator. These serve to underline Allerton’s 
(2002) comment on the restrictiveness of the regulations for the 
specifications of a simulator making it difficult to advance technology 
under the guidelines and restricting manufacturing opportunities. 
For a club or school to invest in a simulator they need assurances it 
will be of benefit both to themselves as a business and to their members. 
The current allowance of five hours for instrument appreciation during 
training provides no incentive for members or Instructors to use it post 
qualification and thus no financial motivation for the club to make the 
investment. Without regulatory provision for use of simulators within GA 
beyond the five hours currently advocated and with restrictive compliance 
regulations, the result is a closed loop scenario with no opportunity for 
clubs or individuals to make use of simulation in UK GA.  
GA pilots engage in the industry because they love to fly and would 
likely concur with the notion that there is no absolute substitute for real 
flying and so would not wish to foster all their flying hours in a virtual 
world. However, should they be allowed to make use of and log time in a 
simulator to maintain currency at an affordable rate, practise procedures 
or emergency scenarios, recover a wasted days flying due to bad weather, or 
improve their skills in instrument flying, then there would be a much 
stronger case for clubs to invest in a simulator to satisfy the potential 
demand.  
Further to this, the authors support the introduction of frequent 
checks on GA pilots, similar to those given to commercial pilots, as 
proposed by Allerton (2002)
 
where simulators are used to perform the 
checks, the content reflecting situations that are most prevalent in 
accidents.  
There remains the question of transferability of training from 
simulation to real flight and whether the authorities and industry can be 
assured of its effectiveness. 
 
TRANSFER OF SKILLS ASSURED? 
Little doubt endures over the effectiveness of simulation training in 
commercial aviation and its impact on safety. If these benefits could be 
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applied to GA they would serve to improve the quality of training and 
safety as a consequence (Allerton, 2002). Commercial pilots perform their 
simulation tasks in Full Flight Simulator (FFS) devices which accurately 
depict the cockpit of a specific aircraft type, contain computer programmes 
to represent the aircraft in ground and flight operations, use a visual 
system providing an out of flight deck view and a force cueing motion 
system (CAA, 2012). Research has shown, however, that for some procedures, 
such as crew coordination, PC-based simulations, when properly designed and 
executed can be useful training tools (Jentsch & Bowers, 1998) and can 
provide low-cost, realistic flight education programmes to teach the 
fundamentals of CRM and decision making (Duncan & Feterle, 2000). Connolly 
et al (1989) also believed that effective judgement training can be 
accomplished without flight time in an actual aircraft, but in a simulator. 
Beyond commercial aviation, simulation has proven to be useful in 
other industries such as medicine. The skills acquired by simulation-based 
training give an adequate measure of transferability to the operative 
setting (Sturm et al., 2008) and can be a valuable complement to an 
aircraft in military combat training (Bell & Waag, 1998).  Following an 
experimental study by Gopher et al. (1994) to test the transfer of skills 
from a complex computer game to the flight performance of cadets in the 
Israeli Air Force, the game was incorporated into the Force’s regular 
training program. In driver training, Ivancic & Hesketh (2000) found that 
learning from errors in a simulator encouraged the adoption of safer 
driving practises.  
Today, flying can be replicated with a relatively inexpensive computer 
system and a PC-based simulation game with modifications such as ‘scenery 
add-ons.’ There is some debate as to whether this would be sufficient, but 
as Lee (2005) stated, low fidelity simulation has been shown to provide 
effective training. Studies specific to PC-based simulation in aviation 
training, all found evidence to support training transfer. Taylor et al 
(1999) determined a Personal Computer Aviation Training Device (PCATD) to 
be an effective training device for PPL instrument training whilst Dennis 
and Harris (1998) concluded that not only did a computer-based flight 
simulation package produce superior performance for those who used it 
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compared to a group that received no prior simulation training, but they 
also commented that mounting evidence suggests PC-based systems to be very 
cost effective accessories to ab initio training. 
Emphasis needs to be on the structure of the training rather than the 
fidelity of the simulator. As Koonce and Bramble (1998)
 
pointed out, many 
studies have demonstrated that increased fidelity is not necessary for 
effective transfer of training. Others refer to evidence that too much or 
unneeded fidelity can in fact decrease training effectiveness by causing 
distractions; Orlady and Orlady (1999, p371)
 
quote Prophet to emphasise the 
point that ‘‘Aviation personnel have concentrated too much on devices - 
simulators and trainers - and not enough on their use…we are hardware 
oriented, when we should be training oriented.’’  
Concurrent with visual fidelity is the concept of motion in simulators 
and how it improves training transfer. There is evidence that simulator 
motion does have a small, positive effect on pilot training transfer (Vaden 
& Hall, 2005), but there is also support for non-motion simulators being 
useful for training tasks such as slow flight and stall tasks (Anderson & 
Macchiarella, 2004). Bürki-Cohen et al. (1998) suggested that today’s 
visual systems are of such high quality, they render motion superfluous. 
Overall, simulation is perceived favourably and studies in this area 
generally agree there is a case for simulation providing training that is 
transferable to the real aircraft, even from PC-based devices. Rose et al
 
(2000) concluded there is firm scientific evidence of transfer from 
training in a virtual environment (VE) to real world tasks.  
 As motion only appears to have a minimal positive impact on training 
transfer and the costs involved in motion simulation are much higher than 
for the alternatives, there is no need for it in GA training. A standard 
cockpit mock up with PC-based visuals would be sufficient to perform the 
training tasks required to reduce LOC accidents, improve pilot currency 
levels and to support competence checks for GA pilots throughout their 
flying career. Unfortunately, it is the authorities reliance on maximum 
realism that makes them believe it is necessary (Caro, 1988)
 
and until they 
release themselves from this out-dated notion, greater simulation will not 
be adopted in GA and will continue to be reserved for commercial operations 
only. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Loss of Control is a major factor in UK general aviation perpetuated 
by a lack of pilot experience and currency. For some pilots elements such 
as the weather and cost of flying inhibit their ability to maintain 
currency, putting them at increased risk of LOC type accidents. 
Currently, training focuses on recovery from induced stalls, little 
time being invested in prevention. Upon completion of training pilots are 
not required to undergo any form of refresher training unless their 
currency is so poor as to necessitate a license revalidation. Nor are they 
required to undertake any form of decision making instruction or training. 
Should a situation occur many years later, pilots may not only have 
difficulty in recalling correct recovery procedures, but as the situation 
will not be a forced one, it will not necessarily replicate the training 
they did receive, exacerbating the situation. 
Landing has been shown to be a particular problem, the addition of 
wind having a negative effect on a pilot’s ability to land safely. Training 
for such a scenario may be deemed as dangerous due to the possibility and 
probability of an accident occurring.  
Restrictive regulations mean there is no incentive for schools and 
clubs to invest in simulators, yet the evidence here suggests they could be 
a valuable tool in reducing accident rates pertaining to loss of control; 
recognition of and recovery from stalling, landing in difficult wind 
conditions can all be trained for and repeatedly practised in a simulator 
in complete safety and at a reduced costs compared to aircraft hire. 
Furthermore, pilots could maintain better levels of currency through use of 
a simulator, if they were able to log the hours flown. 
There is a strong reliance on simulation in the commercial sector to 
maintain pilot competence in normal and emergency procedures and sustain 
safety levels. It is recommended that the same considerations should be 
made for the safety of GA pilots and their passengers, not only in the UK, 
but worldwide. 
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